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Empirical evidence of imperfect integration across world capital markets suggests a role for
cross-border arbitrage by multinationals. Consistent with multinational arbitrage as a deter-
minant of foreign direct investment (FDI) patterns, we ﬁnd that FDI ﬂows increase sharply
with source-country stock market valuations—particularly the component of valuations
that is predicted to revert the next year, and particularly in the presence of capital account
restrictions that limit other mechanisms of cross-country arbitrage. The results suggest the
existence of a cheap ﬁnancial capital channel in which FDI ﬂows reﬂect, in part, the use of
relatively low-cost capital available to overvalued parents in the source country. (JEL F15,
F21, F23, G31, G34)
Traditional ﬁnance theory holds that prices across world capital markets are
equalized by the arbitrage trades of agile portfolio investors, including individ-
uals, fundmanagers, and other institutions that do not take controlling positions
in their investments. As a result, traditional theories of foreign direct investment
(FDI) assume that the more slowly moving FDI ﬂows are not, to any important
degree, a reﬂection of cross-border arbitrage. Instead, the FDI literature focuses
on other (clearly important) effects, such as host-country market size, produc-
tion scale economies, shifting comparative advantages, trade and investment
barriers, and tax rates.1
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In practice, while portfolio investment ﬂows do ensure a fairly high degree
of capital market integration and efﬁciency, they do not ensure perfection.
Even in the largest and most liquid public equity markets, the combination
of limits to cross-country arbitrage and either ﬂuctuations in risk aversion by
local investors or irrational expectations can cause cross-market mispricings
(i.e., prices that differ from the theoretical ideal price that would obtain in per-
fectly integrated and efﬁcient world markets). For example, Froot and Dabora
(1999) study the shares of Royal Dutch, which trades mainly in the United
States, and Shell Transport, which trades mainly in the United Kingdom. Royal
Dutch and Shell pay dividends in a ﬁxed 60:40 ratio. If the US-UK capital mar-
kets were informationally efﬁcient and perfectly integrated, the relative share
price would also be ﬁxed at this ratio, yet the observed price ratio varies from
36:40 to 66:40 over Froot and Dabora’s sample period. Further, the relative
price of Royal Dutch increases when the US market increases relative to the
UK market, suggesting that broad, country-level investor demand pressures
affect local valuations.2
Such evidence suggests that there may be room, on the margin, for arbitrage
activity bymultinationals. In fact,multinationals have some outright advantages
in conducting arbitrage relative to, for example, hedge funds. Consider a hedge
fund manager who sells an overvalued stock short. If the overpricing increases
before it reverts, hemay be forced to close the position at a loss due to themargin
requirements or agency relationships that shorten his horizon (e.g., Shleifer,
2000; and Brunnermeier and Nagel, 2004). The manager of an overvalued
multinational is in a better position. If the manager sells overvalued securities
to purchase overseas assets, and the ﬁrm’s shares subsequently appreciate
further, the shareholders are less likely to be upset. Stein (2005) and Baker,
Ruback, and Wurgler (2006) make similar arguments.
In sum, both empirical and theoretical considerations suggest that FDI ﬂows
may reﬂect arbitrage activity by multinationals. In this paper, we describe and
test two basic types of mispricing-driven FDIs. The ﬁrst is a “cheap ﬁnancial
capital” hypothesis, in which FDI ﬂows are an opportunistic use of the relatively
low-cost ﬁnancial capital available to overvalued source-country ﬁrms. To the
extent that FDI consists of cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A), as
such as Helpman (1984), describe the incentive to locate production to take advantage of factor cost differences.
Empirical evidence on these channels include Brainard (1997); Carr, Markusen, and Maskus (2001); Blonigen,
Davies, and Head (2003); and Yeaple (2003). Gordon and Hines (2002) survey the literature on the effect of
host-country tax rates on FDI. All of these models retain the assumption that capital markets are informationally
efﬁcient and integrated. A notable exception to the focus on nonﬁnancial factors is Froot and Stein (1991). They
focus on information problems in ﬁnancial contracting, but maintain the assumption of globally integrated and
informationally efﬁcient markets. We return to their theory, and related empirical studies, later in the paper.
2 Unfortunately, the Royal Dutch and Shell experiment recently ended with the ﬁnal combination of the two
entities. Rosenthal and Young (1990); Froot and Dabora (1999); and de Jong, Rosenthal, and van Dijk (2004)
discuss other cases of “Siamese twin” shares whose relative price behavior is best explained by some form of
relative market mispricing. Studies of country closed-end funds by Hardouvelis, La Porta, and Wizman (1994)
and Bodurtha, Kim, and Lee (1995) offer another clean setting in which the valuation of a set of cash ﬂows
appears to depend onwhere it trades. Bekaert (1995); Bekaert and Harvey (1995); and Henry (2000) ﬁnd evidence
of stock market segmentation in broader samples of countries and ﬁrms.
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opposed to greenﬁeld investment, this hypothesis can be seen as an application
of Shleifer and Vishny’s (2003) model of mispricing-driven acquisitions to a
cross-border setting. The second is a “cheap assets” or “ﬁre-sale” hypothesis,
under which FDI ﬂows reﬂect the purchase of undervalued host-country assets.
This idea is expressed often in the ﬁnancial media, especially in the context
of ﬁnancial crises, and has been developed by Shleifer and Vishny (1992) and
especially Krugman (1998) and Aguiar and Gopinath (2005).
FDI also sheds light on why corporate investment is correlated with stock
prices within countries. Host-country valuations contain relatively more infor-
mation about themarginal productivity of FDI, while source-country valuations
are likely to be more relevant to a foreign investor’s cost of capital. By contrast,
standard investment-Q equations do not allow one to estimate the extent to
which a positive coefﬁcient on the stock market proxy for Q reﬂects the effect
of the marginal product of capital or the cost of capital (i.e., the numerator or
denominator of the theoretical marginal Q ratio). Studies in the wake of Tobin
(1969) assume that capital markets are integrated and efﬁcient and thus rule
out an independent channel for the cost of capital, while more recent work
revisits Keynes’s (1936) hypothesis that cheap capital has a major effect of its
own. Therefore, in separating the empirical effects of source- and host-country
valuations on FDI, our results shed new light on both the determinants of FDI
and corporate investment more broadly deﬁned.
To testwhether the cheapﬁnancial capital and cheap assets hypotheses help to
explain FDI ﬂows between countries, we study how FDI ﬂows depend on host-
and source-country stock market valuations. The key econometric challenge
is to determine whether the correlation between FDI and stock market valua-
tions arises from multinational arbitrage or, alternatively, from the traditional
FDI determinants listed in the introductory paragraph. We start by outlining a
fairly general empirical methodology that helps us identify the presence of an
independent misvaluation effect. We then apply this methodology to our main
sample, which merges the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) data on
FDI ﬂows and the extended international stock market valuation and returns
data assembled by Fama and French (1998). The BEA data cover two kinds
of FDI: FDI between US parents and their foreign afﬁliates and FDI between
foreign parents and their US afﬁliates. The merged sample spans 1974 to 2001,
and it includes observations in which 19 foreign countries are either the source
of FDI into the U.S. or the host of FDI out of the U.S. For robustness, we also
study two other FDI datasets.
Our preliminary analysis involves simple regressions of FDI ﬂows on source-
and host-country stockmarket valuations. FDI ﬂows are very strongly positively
related to the average market-equity-to-book-equity-value ratio of publicly
traded ﬁrms in the source country, potentially consistentwith the cheap ﬁnancial
capital hypothesis. Indeed, source-country valuations have a stronger effect than
essentially any other determinant of FDI ﬂows that we consider. At the same
time, FDI ﬂows are unrelated to the market-to-book ratios of host countries,
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contrary to the ﬁre-sale hypothesis. Because the ﬁre-sale hypothesis does not
pass this preliminary test, we focus on the cheap ﬁnancial capital hypothesis
for the rest of the paper.
As just mentioned, because stockmarket valuations capture not onlymispric-
ing but many other “traditional” determinants of FDI, the strong relationship
between FDI ﬂows and source-country valuations is only a suggestive pre-
liminary ﬁnding, not itself sufﬁcient evidence for the cheap ﬁnancial capital
hypothesis. Our three most important and conclusive tests, which are derived
from our econometric methodology but are also intuitive, allow us to document
an independent misvaluation effect.
First, we apply the logic that mispricings that do appear will tend to correct
over time. We use ex post stock market returns to instrument for the component
of source-country market-to-book that reﬂects ex ante mispricing. We ﬁnd that
FDI ﬂows are especially strongly related to this component. In other words,
FDI is high prior to periods of relatively low source-country returns. FDI is also
high when the residual, and more permanent, component of the source-country
market-to-book is high. Thus, we argue that the strong empirical relationship
between source-country valuations and FDI ﬂows reﬂects both traditional fun-
damental factors, which are captured in high valuations that are not transient,
as well as overvaluation that soon reverts. A crude calculation suggests that
mispricing is about half as important as the fundamental component of source-
country valuations, a magnitude that strikes us as both signiﬁcant and plausible.
Second, we use cross-country variation in the degree of limits on arbitrage
provided by formal capital controls. These controls limit cross-market arbitrage
and so, other things equal, increase the likelihood that an extreme value of
market-to-book reﬂects mispricing. Thus capital controls are an instrument for
the existence and extent of mispricing, as opposed to the level of valuations.
We ﬁnd that source-country valuations indeed have stronger effects on FDI
in the presence of capital controls—particularly controls that inhibit other
types of cross-country arbitrage, such as capital and money market transaction
restrictions. This suggests that a portion of FDI is a substitute for arbitrage that
would probably have been conducted by traditional portfolio ﬂows, were they
not inhibited by regulation.
Third, we combine the power of these two approaches. We ﬁnd that the com-
ponent of source-country market-to-book plausibly associated with mispricing
has its strongest effect when capital accounts are closed. This result is again
closely consistent with the cheap ﬁnancial capital version of multinational ar-
bitrage, but not with any of the traditional FDI theories that posit that world
capital markets are perfectly integrated and informationally efﬁcient.
In summary, while our empirical tests do not rule out alternative explanations
for FDI, they appear to rule in that a component of FDI reﬂects cross-market
arbitrage by multinationals. In addition to suggesting a new perspective on FDI
ﬂows, the results also bear onwithin-country investment research. That is, in the
US ﬁnancing and investment literature, the evidence that investment predicts
stock returns is difﬁcult to interpret. It could reﬂect opportunistic corporate
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arbitrage, or alternatively it could reﬂect investment responding to variation in
the rational cost of capital. In our international setting, the distance between
the use and source of funds makes this alternative explanation less plausible.
Our results show that investment by German ﬁrms in the U.S. predicts returns
in Germany. This pattern is hard to reconcile with a null of integrated capital
markets and more consistent with corporate arbitrage across borders. Also, and
perhaps most important, we are able to exploit an instrument for cross-country
mispricing, namely, capital controls. Critics of prior work on the real effects
of mispricing have questioned whether circumstances exist that would give
rise to mispricing. The existence of capital controls allows us to pinpoint such
circumstances in a way that is difﬁcult to do within the U.S.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 describes two basic types of
mispricing-based FDI and related literature. Section 2 presents the method-
ology and data. Section 3 contains the empirical results. Section 4 concludes.
1. Mispricing-Driven FDI: Two Hypotheses
The Siamese twins and related evidence suggest that similar capital assets
sometimes trade at different prices in different markets. There are two types
of arbitrage by multinationals that could be a response to such discrepancies.
The ﬁrst is driven by overvaluation of the buyer or the capital it raises based on
temporarily inﬂated collateral values. The second emphasizes the undervalua-
tion of the assets being bought. Of course, either or both types may be behind a
given “relative-value” arbitrage. Thus, while we will outline these stories sep-
arately for expositional clarity, we will keep in mind the possibility that they
may operate simultaneously, and that it is an empirical matter whether they
are equally important or one is dominant. We return to this point in remarks
below.
Another important point is that here and throughout the paper, the terms “mis-
pricing” and “nonfundamental” are used as a shorthand to denote deviations
from a theoretical, integrated, and efﬁcient world capital market benchmark
price. That is, whether the price of similar capital assets diverges across coun-
tries because of ﬂuctuations in risk aversion by local investors (combined with
limited arbitrage) or because of irrational expectations (combined with lim-
ited arbitrage), we refer to the result as a mispricing, relative to the traditional
null hypothesis of integrated and efﬁcient capital markets. Fortunately, there
is little need to distinguish further, because for our purpose, the interpretation
of FDI as an “arbitrage” mechanism is similar regardless of the cause of the
“mispricing.”
1.1 Cheap ﬁnancial capital hypothesis
We call FDI driven by the overvaluation of the buyer the cheap ﬁnancial cap-
ital channel. According to this hypothesis, FDI is an opportunistic use of the
temporarily low-cost ﬁnancial capital (again, relative to the theoretical world
benchmark cost of capital) available to overvalued ﬁrms in the source country.
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To the extent that FDI reﬂects cross-border M&A, this hypothesis is an applica-
tion of the Shleifer and Vishny (2003) model of mispricing-driven acquisitions
to a cross-border setting. There, managers of an overvalued acquirer know
that the overpricing will end eventually, but they can beneﬁt ongoing investors,
at the expense of new ones, by issuing new capital to buy less-overpriced assets.
For ﬁrms overvalued due to a local asset price bubble, for example, candidate
investments would include overseas targets that are not particularly overvalued,
as well as zero-NPV greenﬁeld investment.
There are other versions of the cheap ﬁnancial capital hypothesis that require
less of managers. Indeed, managers may have correlated biases, occasionally
overvaluing investment opportunities in the same direction as capital market
participants. Also, managers may act in their own, empire building interests,
and not in the interests of existing shareholders. Our point in this paper is
simply that these investments, whatever their motivation, can be facilitated
with cheap ﬁnancial capital. Our tests, and our results, pinpoint the tendency of
the market to misprice investment, whatever be its source. Put simply, agency
problems alone cannot explain why FDI precedes low source-country stock
market returns. Outside investors must also underestimate the extent of the
overinvestment problem ex ante. Low returns coincide with the correction of
these expectations.
The cheap capital channel can also operate even if we do not observe ﬁrms
issuing new public equity locally and buying foreign assets. For instance, by
its effect on perceived collateral values, overpriced equity also reduces the cost
of debt, and thus can also stimulate cash-ﬁnanced FDI. That is, in the style
of Bernanke and Gertler (1995) and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (2000),
widely used credit scoring models, such as Moody’s KMV, use share prices
as an input to assess credit risk, and so overpriced shares thus can lead to an
abnormally low cost of debt. In addition, extensions of such models, such as
KMV’s Private Firm Model, estimate credit risk for private ﬁrms using market
valuations of comparable public ﬁrms, suggesting how unusually high stock
market valuations could reduce the cost of capital of nontraded ﬁrms as well.
These sorts of considerations, as well as practical data constraints, are why we
will not focus on how FDI is ﬁnanced in our empirical tests.
To our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst to outline and test a cheap ﬁnancial capital
view of FDI.3 However, a closely related literature presents evidence that the
cheap ﬁnancial capital story helps to explain investment and merger activity
within countries. For example, stock market valuations are strong determinants
of equity issuance, and both new equity and debt issues are followed by low
stock returns, consistent with the timing of new issuance to price peaks that
3 In an interesting study, Barrell and Pain (1996) use interest rates, depreciation, and exchange rates to estimate the
relative user cost of capital in the U.S. and “the world” (an FDI-weighted average of estimates in Canada, Japan,
Germany, France, and the UK) as one of several determinants of the time series of US outward FDI. There are
many differences between our analyses. Perhaps the most relevant is how we approach the measurement of the
cost of capital. We are interested in the hypothesis that misvaluation in the capital markets inﬂuences FDI, but
they do not use stock market data and therefore do not test this proposition.
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are subsequently corrected. Using US data, some researchers have also found
support for the mispricing-driven acquisitions theory.4
1.2 Cheap assets hypothesis
We refer to FDI that is the purchase of temporarily undervalued host-country
assets as the cheap assets channel. Once again, to be precise, by undervalued
we mean only that assets are priced lower than the theoretical, integrated-and-
efﬁcient-world-market benchmark price. Undervaluation could follow from a
collapse in investor sentiment for host-country assets that takes the form of a
stockmarket crash; from a “rational” upward shift in host-country risk aversion;
or a liquidity crisis that causes liquidity-constrained ﬁrms to be available at ﬁre-
sale valuations to unconstrained foreign buyers. The latter story is similar to
Shleifer and Vishny (1992) and in particular Krugman (1998) and Aguiar and
Gopinath (2005).
Under this hypothesis, stockmarket valuations can have either a direct effect,
such as when a stock market crash reduces valuations below fundamental
levels, or indirect effects. In a liquidity crisis, low valuations might be largely
driven by the perceived inability of local ﬁrms to pursue domestic investment
opportunities. To the extent that valuations of unlisted ﬁrms are correlated with
those of listed ﬁrms, stock market valuations would then be best seen as a proxy
for the valuation of domestic capital assets in general.
To our knowledge, there has been no large-sample investigation of the cheap
assets hypothesis of FDI that spans many countries and a broad time period.
The available evidence includes Aguiar and Gopinath (2005), who ﬁnd that
cross-border M&A increased in ﬁve Asian countries during the late 1990s’
ﬁnancial crisis and that foreign acquirers focused on liquidity-constrained ﬁrms,
and Chari, Ouimet, and Tesar (2004), who ﬁnd that merger announcement
returns are not higher for deals involving targets in developing countries during
times of crisis. While important contributions, these studies do not examine
whether the cheap assets hypothesis is an important general determinant of
FDI ﬂows—after all, most FDI ﬂows are between developed countries—or is
only operational in crisis situations. Clearly, the theoretical notion that FDI is
driven by undervaluation of the host-country assets is not restricted to ﬁnancial
crises.
4 Baker, Ruback, and Wurgler (2006) survey this literature. Studies connecting valuations to equity issuance
include Marsh (1982); Loughran, Ritter, and Rydqvist (1994); Jung, Kim, and Stulz (1996); Pagano, Panetta, and
Zingales (1998); and Graham and Harvey (2001). Ritter (1991); Loughran and Ritter (1995); Speiss and Afﬂeck-
Graves (1995); and Baker and Wurgler (2000), among others, ﬁnd that equity issuers earn low subsequent stock
returns, while Speiss and Afﬂeck-Graves (1999) and Richardson and Sloan (2003) ﬁnd the same for debt issuers.
Henderson, Jegadeesh, and Weisbach (2006) ﬁnd similar patterns in cross-border issues. Fischer and Merton
(1984); Barro (1990); Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990); Blanchard, Rhee, and Summers (1993); Stein (1996);
Chirinko and Schaller (2001, 2006); Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003); Polk and Sapienza (2006); and Gilchrist,
Himmelberg, and Huberman (2005) study the connection between investment and stock market mispricing.
Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson, and Teoh (2006) and Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005) argue
that mispricing affects merger activity in US data. In contrast, Brav and Gompers (1997) and Fama (1998)
challenge the abnormality of the low returns after equity issues, while Harford (2004) argues for fundamental
shocks, not market timing, as driving US merger waves.
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1.3 Remarks
As mentioned above, the two theories of mispricing-driven FDI are not mutu-
ally exclusive, but they are distinct. It is conceivable that both effects operate
simultaneously or that only one or the other effect exists. A simple example
(that abstracts from some complexities of FDI) helps illustrate this. The de-
mand for new residential construction may be driven by the cost of ﬁnance, as
well as the price of vacant lots. Whether one or both are a determinant of new
construction is an empirical question. A conjecture is that lower mortgage rates
increase the demand for new houses, but with no migration to locations where
land is undervalued. In other words, a cheap asset effect may not inﬂuence
the choice of where to purchase a new home, even if a cheap ﬁnancial capital
effect inﬂuences the choice of whether to purchase a new home. In the same
way, it is possible that the source-country cost of capital increases outbound
investment by multinationals, but that the particular destination is based on
other considerations like strategic ﬁt and not on price alone.
A priori, it is not obvious which hypothesis is more promising. The cheap
assets story is mentioned more often by the ﬁnancial press, while several aca-
demic studies claim to document cheap ﬁnancial capital effects within coun-
tries. There are reasons to think that the cheap ﬁnancial capital view is a priori
more plausible, however. First, it asks a manager to identify misvaluation only
in his own ﬁrm, as opposed to that of a target asset that may be thousands
of miles away. Second, an asymmetric limit on arbitrage, such as a short-sale
constraint, would tend to increase the scope for FDI as a means to exploit over-
valuation relative to undervaluation, thus increasing the relative potential for
cheap capital effects. In any case, despite ample theoretical motivation, neither
view of FDI has received much large-sample empirical attention.
2. Methodology and Data
2.1 Methodology
The two hypotheses of interest are that FDI is higher when (1) ﬁnancial capital
in the source country is unusually cheap and/or when (2) assets in the host
country are unusually cheap. Our proxies for “cheapness” are country-level
stock market valuations and returns. We relate these proxies to FDI using
the methodology below. The key econometric challenge that our methodology
attempts to solve is to separately identify the effect of stockmarketmisvaluation
(“cheapness” or “richness”) from the effects of other inﬂuences on FDI, in
particular those that are also reﬂected in stock valuations. We describe our
approach in terms of identifying the effect of source-country valuations (i.e.,
in terms of evaluating the cheap ﬁnance hypothesis); the analysis of the effect
of host-country valuations is symmetric.
Suppose that the FDI ﬂow from source country i to host country j is given
by
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FDIi j t = a + bδi t + cSφi t + cHφ j t + ε1i j t , (1)
whereFDIi jt is the ﬂow of capital between parent ﬁrms in country i and their
foreign afﬁliates in country j, δ is the degree of overvaluation in country i at
time t, and φk measures fundamentals in country k. Fundamentals are measured
by a potentially long vector of country characteristics, which might in principle
include the level of human capital, legal or technological development, prof-
itable investment opportunities, and other fundamental (i.e., nonmispricing)
determinants of FDI, multiplied by a set of loadings. We want to test whether
b is greater than zero.
As a preliminary test, we run regressions using the country-level market-to-
book-value ratio as a proxy for δ. If book value serves as a rough measure of
fundamentals, a high market-to-book is consistent with overvaluation, and a
body of prior results does suggest that market-to-book includes a component
of mispricing.5 A country-level price-earnings or price-dividend ratio could
also be used as a proxy for misvaluation, but scaling by book equity seems
preferable because it ensures that the denominator is positive and it reduces the
inﬂuence of transient ﬂuctuations in proﬁts or payouts. Our preliminary tests
therefore involve regressions like
FDIijt = aˆ + ˆb1 MBit + e1ijt. (2)
Of course, a positive and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient does not prove that b > 0,
because, as just pointed out, themarket-to-book ratio includes both fundamental
and mispricing components:
M
Bit
= d + δi t + φi t , (3)
where the coefﬁcients on δ and φ are normalized to be one. M/B is exchange-
rate invariant, and to ease the exposition, we are assuming that there is no
measurement error in M/B (spherical measurement error will reduce the power
of our tests) and that there is a linear decomposition of market-to-book into
fundamental andmisvaluation components. Themessage of Equation (3) is that
while themarket-to-book ratiomay be a good proxy for δ, it is also a good proxy
for many other omitted country characteristics that inﬂuence FDI, such as host-
country GDP, tax rates, and factor endowments, and these fundamentals may
be correlated with the stock market. As a result, b1 will be a biased estimator of
b. While we could control for some of these effects directly in Equation (2) by
5 Market-to-book is inversely related to future equity returns in the cross section of US stocks (Basu, 1983; and
Fama and French, 1992) and international stocks (Fama and French, 1998), and the aggregate US market-to-
book ratio is inversely related to subsequent market returns (Kothari and Shanken, 1997; and Pontiff and Schall,
1998). These results are consistent with the view that extreme values of market-to-book represent, in part,
misvaluations that subsequently correct. Extreme values of market-to-book are directly connected to extreme
investor expectations by La Porta (1996); La Porta et al. (1997); and Frankel and Lee (1998).
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including additional variables, we make the conservative assumption that some
omitted variable bias is likely to remain, and so we need to ﬁnd a solution.
As a concrete and particularly difﬁcult example of omitted variable bias,
consider the rational expectations version of the “wealth effect” in Froot and
Stein (1991), further studied by Klein and Rosengren (1994); Dewenter (1995);
and Klein, Peek, and Rosengren (2002). This theory focuses on information
problems in ﬁnancial contracting that cause external ﬁnancing to bemore costly
than internal ﬁnancing, but itmaintains an assumption of globally integrated and
informationally efﬁcient capital markets. In this theory, FDI patterns are driven
by cross-country differences in ﬁrms’ collateralizable wealth, or ﬁnancial slack.
Positive shocks to relative wealth, as might result from unhedged exchange
rate changes or stock market ﬂuctuations, allow ﬁrms in the relative-wealth-
increasing country to escape borrowing constraints and outbid ﬁrms in the
relative-wealth-decreasing country for domestic assets.
To address this alternative explanation and generic omitted variable bias, we
derive and execute three more pointed tests that lead to a cleaner empirical
identiﬁcation of mispricing-driven FDI. The ﬁrst uses the future returns on the
source-country stock market as a cleaner proxy for mispricing. The idea is that,
if the stock market were overvalued at the end of 1990, we would expect lower
returns in subsequent years as the mispricing is eventually corrected. There is
no a priori notion of the exact horizon over which to expect correction; too short
a horizon leaves open the possibility that the mispricing is not yet corrected,
while too long reduces power in a short time series. We use 1-year-ahead
returns to match the collection period of our FDI data. This also happens to
be consistent with Kothari and Shanken (1997) and Pontiff and Schall (1998),
who ﬁnd that aggregate market-to-book forecasts 1-year-ahead returns (with a
negative coefﬁcient).
Putting this in the context of Equation (1), the ﬁrst approach to addressing
omitted variables bias starts by viewing returns at t + 1 as a function of δ at
time t:
Rit+1 = e + f δi t + ε2i t+1, (4)
where f < 0, i.e., overvaluation at time t leads to lower average returns in t + 1.
Here, we assume that future returns are not related to fundamentals, φ. In other
words, we assume that countries with a higher level of human capital, legal or
technological development, or growth opportunities do not have systematically
lower returns.6 Our ﬁrst approach is then to regress market-to-book on future
returns and use the ﬁtted values to explain FDI:
FDIijt = aˆ + ˆb2
ˆM
Bit
+ e2ijt. (5)
6 The orthogonality conditions are that the correlations between δ and ε2, and between φ and ε2, are zero.
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Because the ﬁtted values are uncorrelated with φ, this test gives us an unbiased
estimate of b.
Our second solution to omitted variable bias, and thus our second more-
pointed test of mispricing-driven FDI, addresses the possibility that the cor-
relation between φ and ε2 may not be zero. That is, suppose investors are
routinely too optimistic when underlying investment opportunities are gen-
uinely good—the recent US Internet bubble seems to ﬁt this pattern. If so,
future returns and FDI could be connected without any causality from δ to
FDI.7 To address this possibility, we exploit cross-country variation in capital
market openness and the omitted variable bias in Equation (2) to put a lower
bound on the magnitude of b.
To illustrate this approach, we start by substituting Equation (3) into Equation
(1) to get a clear view of the omitted variable bias. Without loss of generality,
we can substitute for φ, obtaining
FDIijt = (a − cSd) + cS MBit + (b − cS) δi t + cHφ j t + ε1ijt. (6)
Hence in the simple regression of FDI on market-to-book in Equation (2), the
independent variable is not orthogonal to the residuals. The omitted variable
bias takes the form
ˆb1 = cS + (b − cS)
cov
(
M
Bit
, δi t
)
var
(
M
Bit
) , (7)
where the ratio is the fraction of the market-to-book ratio that is explained
by mispricing. As is intuitive, when all variation in market-to-book is due to
mispricing, the coefﬁcient is an unbiased estimate of b; when mispricing is
nonexistent, it is an unbiased estimate of cS.
In perfectly integrated capital markets, arbitrage reduces the absolute value
of δ.8 This suggests using the degree to which the capital market is closed as
an indicator of where δ might appear in the ﬁrst place. Suppose that capital
7 Another critique of our ﬁrst approach is that M/B might predict returns because it is capitalizing the “rational”
discount rate for assets in that country—lower costs of capital imply higher M/B and lower required (expected
future) returns. Keep in mind that our null hypothesis is efﬁcient and integrated world capital markets. Under
this null, risk premiums are set on the world capital market, and variation in valuation ratios such as M/B reﬂect
either variation in rational expectations of cash ﬂows (and investment opportunities) or in the risk inherent in
those cash ﬂows, but not in risk premiums, because they are not country-speciﬁc under the null. Put differently,
while variation in a country’s M/B could reﬂect rational variation in the cost of capital of ﬁrms traded within that
country, this could, under the null, only reﬂect the relatively low risk of corporate assets in that country. It does
not mean that those ﬁrms would have any cost advantage in purchasing overseas assets (or, indeed, domestic
assets), and hence there is no reason, under the null, for such a component of M/B to explain international capital
ﬂows. In any case, this critique is also addressed by our second approach to omitted variable bias.
8 Of course, even within a single capital market, relative mispricing can appear, as demonstrated by Cornell and
Liu (2001); Mitchell, Pulvino, and Stafford (2002); Lamont and Thaler (2003); and Schill and Zhou (2001). But
within a single market as well, mispricings are more common and more severe among securities where arbitrage
is relatively difﬁcult. Many examples are cited in Shleifer (2000).
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market closedness perfectly measures the extent (not the direction) of the mis-
pricing problem (i.e., the fraction of country stock valuations not explained
by fundamentals). In other words, capital market closedness is a proxy for the
covariance term in Equation (7):
cov
(
M
Bit
, δi t
)
var
(
M
Bit
) = gCACit + ε3i t , (8)
where CAC measures the degree to which the capital market in country i is
closed at t and ε3 is assumed to be orthogonal to CAC, φ, and ε1. Then, by
substituting Equation (8) into Equation (7) and the result into Equation (2), we
can estimate
FDIijt = aˆ +
(
ˆb3CACit + cˆS
) · M
Bit
+ e3ijt. (9)
Here, b3 is not a direct estimate of b but rather of g(b − cS). So if b3 is
greater than zero, we can infer that a unit change in the mispricing component
of market-to-book has a greater impact on FDI than a unit change in the
fundamentals component. Of course, in the estimation below, we also control
for the direct effect of capital restrictions to be sure that the result is coming
from the interaction of valuations and the proxy for limits on cross-country
arbitrage.
To summarize, our second approach to omitted variable bias uses the ob-
servation that, all else equal, cross-market mispricing is more likely when
cross-market arbitrage is difﬁcult and takes the presence of capital restrictions
as a natural proxy for this difﬁculty. The cheap ﬁnance hypothesis then pre-
dicts that FDI and valuations will be especially closely related when the source
market is segmented. Other theories of FDI that assume efﬁcient and integrated
capital markets, including the relative wealth theory of Froot and Stein (1991)
and many other theories, do not make this ﬁner prediction. More generally,
if the relationship between FDI and valuations is simply spurious, there is no
reason it should strengthen in the presence of capital controls.
Finally, a third test for omitted variable bias combines the ﬁrst two. A fuller
version of the model would suggest that the sensitivity of FDI to the component
of valuations that reﬂects mispricing would be higher when capital controls are
operative, while the sensitivity to any residual component would not. Thus we
use future returns as a cleaner proxy for δ and closed capital markets as an
instrument for the existence of mispricing:
FDIijt = aˆ +
(
ˆb4CACit + cˆi
) ·
ˆM
Bit
+ e4ijt. (10)
As before, b4 is not a direct estimate of b, but if it is positive, we infer that the
component of market-to-book that reﬂects mispricing has a greater impact on
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FDI than the component that reﬂects fundamentals. Once again, the value of
this approach is that it tests a unique prediction of the misvaluation-driven FDI
hypotheses. Other theories of FDI do not make predictions for b4.
2.2 FDI data
Direct investment is distinguished from other international capital ﬂows by the
degree to which the investor owns and controls the foreign enterprise. Some
deﬁnitions may be useful. Direct investment is typically deﬁned as the direct
or indirect ownership or control by a single domestic legal entity (the parent)
of at least 10% of the voting securities of an incorporated foreign business
enterprise or the equivalent interest in an unincorporated foreign business en-
terprise (the foreign afﬁliate). Direct investment ﬂows are then the funds that
parents provide to their afﬁliates, net of the funds afﬁliates provide to their
parents.
Direct investment ﬂows are of three basic types: equity capital, intercompany
debt, and reinvested earnings. Equity capital ﬂows include payments between
parents and third parties that occur when parents change their ownership inter-
ests, as well as changes in the equity capital contribution of parents to afﬁliates
that are wholly owned. These ﬂows therefore capture the movement of cap-
ital used for cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Intercompany debt ﬂows
occur when parents alter the level of their net outstanding loans and trade
accounts with the afﬁliate. Reinvested earnings are the parents’ claim on the
current-period undistributed after-tax earnings of afﬁliates.9 Direct investment
positions (i.e., stocks, not ﬂows) are the parents’ net ﬁnancial claims on their
afﬁliates, whether these claims take the form of equity or debt. For further
details on these deﬁnitions, see Borga (2003).
Our main FDI dataset is drawn from the Survey of US Direct Investment
Abroad and the Survey of Foreign Direct Investment in the United States,
both conducted by the US Bureau of Economic Analysis. The data include
information on the positions and ﬂows for two kinds of FDI. The ﬁrst kind is
FDI between US parents and their foreign afﬁliates, and we refer to this as FDI
out of the U.S. The second kind is FDI between foreign parents and their US
afﬁliates, and we refer to this as FDI into the U.S. The data span the period
from 1974 to 2001 and include observations in which 19 foreign countries are
either the source of FDI into the U.S. or the host of FDI out of the U.S. These
series are reasonably complete, and they have been collected on a consistent
basis over time—across source countries for FDI into the U.S., and across hosts
for FDI out of the U.S. We measure FDI ﬂows as percentages of the initial FDI
position:
FDIijt = Flow
i→ j
t
Positioni→ jt−1
, (11)
9 Our reported results are for FDI inclusive of retained earnings. Removing the retained earnings component leads
to identical inferences (results available on request).
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where i is the source country and j is the host.10 Because small initial po-
sitions can lead to outliers in this measure, we winsorize the measure at
+100%. Note that this variable is essentially the growth in the stock of
FDI.
FDI accounting can be confusing, so we explain the data using an example
involving US ﬂows. As mentioned above, the BEA FDI accounts are separated
into FDI ﬂows out of the U.S. (the U.S. is the source country i) and FDI
ﬂows into the U.S. (the U.S. is host country j). If Ford Motor Company has
an afﬁliate in Japan, ﬂows to that afﬁliate are positive FDI ﬂows out of the
U.S., while ﬂows from the Japanese afﬁliate back to the US parent are counted
as negative FDI ﬂows out of the U.S. Similarly, if Honda has an afﬁliate in
the US, ﬂows of capital to that afﬁliate are positive FDI ﬂows into the U.S.,
while ﬂows from the US afﬁliate back to the Japanese parent are negative FDI
ﬂows into the U.S. Therefore, ﬂows out of the U.S. reﬂect decisions made
by US ﬁrms, while ﬂows into the U.S. reﬂect decisions made by Japanese
ﬁrms.11 Also, what is typically reported are measures in which afﬁliate ﬂows
are subtracted from the parent ﬂows. Hence, the numerator in Equation (11)
can be negative.
To assess the robustness of our results, we use two other FDI datasets. One is
M&A data from Securities Data Company (SDC). As noted in United Nations
Center for Transnational Corporations (1999) and Nocke and Yeaple (2007), a
large fraction of FDI ﬂows are due to cross-border mergers and acquisitions.
The SDC sample includes transactions in which a US ﬁrm is either the target or
the acquirer and covers 1978 through 2001, though the ﬁrst half of the sample
appears incomplete.12 We measure M&A-based FDI from the U.S. to the UK,
for example, as the number of acquisitions by US ﬁrms of UK ﬁrms divided by
the initial number of US afﬁliates in the UK. The latter is taken from the BEA
for 1984 through 1999.
10 Like Caves (1989), we scale ﬂows by initial country-speciﬁc stocks. Froot and Stein (1991) scale ﬂows by
GNP, and Dewenter (1995) scales M&A ﬂows into the U.S. by domestic acquisition activity. Scaling by initial
position renders the FDI measure more comparable across countries. This is not important in regressions where
we include country ﬁxed effects. In such regressions, we have veriﬁed that the results are essentially unchanged
when we scale by GDP. In regressions containing future returns, however, such as those along the lines of
Equation (5), we prefer not to use country ﬁxed effects. We are interested in whether FDI is especially high
when future returns are low. With country ﬁxed effects, an alternative and less interesting interpretation would be
that future FDI is low when future returns are low, because demeaned FDI is high. The scaling in Equation (11)
avoids this ambiguity as it removes, to a large extent, the impact of ﬁxed country characteristics on the level of
FDI ﬂows.
11 Conceivably, one might also think of studying, for example, FDI inﬂows into the US net of FDI outﬂows from the
U.S. The problem with this approach is that one cannot separately identify the effect of source- and host-country
valuations. In examining this sort of net ﬂows, the source- and host-country effects are mechanically equal and
opposite, i.e., the net FDI ﬂow between countries X and Y would appear in the data both as a positive ﬂow
between host country X and source country Y and as a negative ﬂow between host country Y and source country
X.
12 One advantage of these data is that acquirer ﬁrms are classiﬁed by their country of origin. Therefore, if a ﬁrm
uses a holding company outside of its home country to buy a ﬁrm in the U.S., we can classify this transaction
as taking place between the acquirer’s home country and the U.S. The FDI ﬂow and position data do not trace
investment back to the country of parent origin.
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We also use a panel of FDI ﬂows and positions from the OECD International
Direct Investment Statistics database. These data include the FDIs made by
multinationals based in OECD countries with respect to a broad set of host
countries, not only OECD members. This sample covers 1980 through 2001.
Although these data would at ﬁrst seem to have an advantage in coverage, data
for many country pairs are missing, and there are signiﬁcant differences in how
countries collect and report their data.13 Nonetheless, results from these data
may provide some useful sense of robustness. We measure FDI ﬂows in the
OECD data as in Equation (11).
The FDI data are summarized in panel A of Table 1. The BEA data contains
407 (439) observations on FDI into (FDI out of) the U.S., or an average of 21.4
(23.1) years of data for each of the 19 non-US countries for which we also have
consistent stock market data. The average annual FDI ﬂows into the U.S. from
one of these countries increases its initial position by 20.30%. Likewise, on
average, the annual FDI ﬂow out of the U.S. to one of these countries increases
its initial position by 11.56%. Mean M&A activity is signiﬁcantly higher for
transactions involving a US acquirer, increasing their number of afﬁliates by
13.83% per year, than for transactions involving a US target, at 3.53% of lagged
afﬁliates. Mean ﬂows from OECD members amount to 17.49% of their initial
positions.
2.3 Stock market valuations and returns
Stockmarket valuations and returns are fromKen French’s website. His data in-
clude yearly observations of the capitalization-weightedmarket-to-book-equity
ratio and stock market returns, in both dollars and local currency, for 19 coun-
tries between 1975 and 2001. For details of the construction of these variables,
see Fama and French (1998).14 We merge in US valuations and returns, taking
the market-to-book of the S&P 500 from Compustat and returns on the S&P
500 from the CRSP database. Panel B of Table 1 reports summary statistics.15
13 Although US data conform closely to international guidelines set by several international organizations, data
from many other countries, including a large number of OECD countries, do not. See Mataloni (1995) for further
discussion of the shortcomings of data collected by countries other than the U.S.
14 The raw data are from Morgan Stanley’s Capital International Perspectives (MSCI). The set of ﬁrms whose data
are used to construct country-level returns and proﬁtability variables is essentially the set of ﬁrms included in
Morgan Stanley’s stock index for that country. These tend to be large ﬁrms, and for a typical country they cover
roughly 80% of the domestic stock market capitalization. Depending on the country and year, the indexes are
based on a minimum of a few dozen large ﬁrms to a maximum of several hundred; see Fama and French (1998),
Table I. As discussed there, there is little issue of survivor bias.
15 Note that our country-level returns and valuations include both multinationals and purely domestic ﬁrms. At least
in the case of source-country effects, it would be desirable to have measures of valuations and returns that pertain
solely to multinationals. Unfortunately, we are not aware of data that would allow us to back out such measures
for non-US countries. However, assuming that multinationals are as prevalent in other countries as they are in
the U.S., aggregate measures will be reasonable. The geographic segment breakdown in the U.S. Compustat
data suggest that multinationals do comprise a large fraction of total market capitalizations. In 2000, 311 of the
S&P 500 ﬁrms that go into computing US market-to-book and returns in our data report geographic segments
outside of the U.S. This subsample represents 69% of S&P 500 capitalization. In any case, an inability to
perfectly isolate multinationals’ valuations and returns would tend to bias results against ﬁnding source-country
effects.
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Table 1
Summary statistics
N Mean Median SD Min Max
Panel A. Foreign direct investment
FDIiUSt (%) 407 20.30 16.29 26.91 −70.97 100.00
FDIUSit (%) 439 11.56 9.60 13.94 −33.78 100.00
M&AiUSt (%) 286 3.53 2.66 3.48 0.00 20.91
M&AUSit (%) 286 13.83 8.28 17.94 0.00 100.00
FDIijt (%) 2,706 17.49 12.15 30.25 −100.00 100.00
Panel B. Stock market valuations and returns
M/Bit 407 1.81 1.66 0.97 0.37 9.84
M/BUSt 407 3.14 2.73 1.78 1.20 7.01
Rit+1 (%, dollar) 388 15.01 11.81 29.25 −47.07 135.80
Rit+1 (%, local) 388 16.14 13.76 27.08 −39.42 153.67
RUSt+1 (%, dollar) 388 14.91 20.42 14.77 −11.09 35.71
Panel C. Country characteristics and controls
ROEit (%) 407 12.08 11.73 3.94 3.47 31.75
ROEUSt (%) 407 16.19 14.99 4.06 10.65 22.98
Exrateit (1975 = 1) 407 1.04 1.01 0.20 0.56 1.69
GDPit ($B1990) 407 803 297 1,140 29 5,680
GDP/Capit ($1990) 407 24,890 23, 821 8,330 10,742 47,064
Taxit (%) 407 34.77 35.00 10.97 5.43 56.00
CACit 407 3.76 3.00 2.83 0.00 9.00
Means, medians, standard deviations, and extreme values for FDI, stock market valuations and returns, and
country characteristics. Panel A summarizes data on FDI from three sources. FDIiUSt and FDIUSit are from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis and report annual FDI ﬂows in which the U.S. is the host or the source country,
respectively. FDI ﬂows are measured here as the FDI ﬂow as a percentage of the beginning of year stock.
M&AiUSt and M&AiUSt are from SDC and measure cross-border M&A activity involving US ﬁrms as targets or
acquirers, respectively. M&A ﬂows are expressed as the number of new afﬁliates acquired as a percentage of
the number of afﬁliates existing at the beginning of the year. FDIijt is a full panel of bilateral FDI ﬂows among
developed countries from OECD International Direct Investment Statistics. FDI ﬂows are measured here as the
gross FDI ﬂow as a percentage of the beginning of year stock. FDI ﬂows are winsorized at 100%. Panel B shows
stock market valuations and returns data. International stock market returns in dollar and local terms, Rit, and the
average market-equity-to-book-equity ratio of public ﬁrms, M/Bit, are from Ken French’s website and are based
on data fromMorgan Stanley’s Capital International Perspectives (MSCI).We use the S&P 500 return fromCRSP
and the S&P 500 market-to-book ratio from Compustat to merge in US values. Panel C summarizes country
characteristics and control variables for a sample of country-years that represents the intersection between the
stock market data and the BEA data on FDI into the U.S. For non-US countries, the return on equity ROEi is
from Ken French’s website and based on MSCI data. US values for the S&P 500 are from Compustat. The real
exchange rate is from IMF International Financial Statistics and is in units of foreign currency per US dollar,
with the index set to 1 for 1975. GDP and GDP per capita measured in constant 1995 US dollars are from the
World Bank’s World Development Indicators. Non-US income tax rates Taxi are from the World Tax Database
maintained by the Ofﬁce of Tax Policy Research at the University of Michigan. The index of capital account
closedness CACit is from Brune et al. (2001).
2.4 Country characteristics and controls
Other data come from several sources. The return on equity, weighted across
publicly traded ﬁrms by book value, is from Ken French’s website. The real
exchange rate is calculated using nominal exchange rates and price indices from
the IMF International Financial Statistics. Exchange rates are indexed with the
US dollar exchange rate in 1975 set to 1 in each country. GDP and GDP per
capita in 1995 US dollars are from the World Bank’s World Development
Indicators. Statutory corporate income tax rates, representing the maximum
marginal statutory corporate tax rates in that country-year, are from the World
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Tax Database maintained by the Ofﬁce of Tax Policy Research at the University
of Michigan. Capital account closedness is based on Brune et al. (2001). Their
openness index equals the number of nine capital account transactions that
are not signiﬁcantly restricted. To form a “closedness” index that matches
our econometric derivation, we take nine minus their “openness” index, thus
counting the number of capital account transactions that are restricted. Panel
C of Table 1 reports summary statistics.
3. Empirical Results
3.1 Valuation levels
Table 2 starts with preliminary regressions, in the spirit of Equation (2), to
establish the basic correlations between FDI and stock market valuations. The
dependent variables are the BEA measures of FDI into and out of the U.S. The
independent variables of interest are the source- and host-country market-to-
book ratios. To the extent that market-to-book captures misvaluation, the cheap
ﬁnancial capital story predicts that the coefﬁcient on the market-to-book of
the source-country stock market will be positive, while the cheap asset story
predicts that the coefﬁcient on the market-to-book of the host country will be
negative.
The speciﬁcations in Table 2 are similar to the standard investment-Q equa-
tions used to study investment within countries, except that we can separate the
effects of source- and host-country valuations, which is novel in itself. (Caves,
1989; and Klein and Rosengren, 1994, only consider the ratio of source and
host valuations on FDI.) However, the BEA data, while preferable in other
respects, are not suited to testing the cheap ﬁnance and cheap assets stories
simultaneously. In the left columns of Table 2, which study FDI into the U.S.
from 19 source countries, source-country valuations vary by country-year, but
host (U.S.) valuations vary yearly, so their effect cannot be estimated in the
presence of year effects. In the right columns, which examine FDI out of the
U.S., host valuations vary by country-year but source (U.S.) valuation effects
are estimated only from the fairly short time series (27 years). Given this struc-
ture of the data, we analyze FDI into the U.S. to provide preliminary tests of
the cheap ﬁnancial capital view, and we analyze FDI out of the U.S. to provide
preliminary tests of the cheap assets view.
As discussed above, market-to-book also picks up omitted determinants of
FDI, so Table 2 is not a conclusive test of our hypotheses, just a ﬁrst step. In these
regressions, we also try to control directly for several other FDI determinants.
Froot and Stein (1991) and Blonigen (1997) ﬁnd that real exchange rates
affect FDI into the U.S., so we include them. Cash ﬂow is often included
alongside Tobin’s Q in investment equations to control for ﬁnancial slack and
fundamental investment opportunities; Fazarri, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988)
and Lamont (1997) ﬁnd that investment increases in internal ﬁnance, perhaps
because external ﬁnance is more costly. We do not have a long time series of
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Table 2
FDI and stock market valuations
FDI into the U.S. (FDIiUSt) FDI out of the U.S. (FDIUSit)
Coef t-stat Coef t-stat Coef t-stat Coef t-stat Coef t-stat Coef t-stat
M/Bit 6.29 [2.51] 9.86 [4.71] 8.05 [3.48] 1.22 [1.18] 1.35 [1.46] 0.57 [0.52]
M/BUSt −2.31 [−2.78] 0.47 [0.26] 0.75 [1.71] 0.63 [0.89]
ROEit −1.17 [−2.68] −1.21 [−2.51] 0.62 [3.14] 0.31 [1.42]
ROEUSt 0.95 [1.76] 0.08 [0.43]
Exrateit 0.03 [0.33] −0.23 [−1.55] −0.06 [−2.20] −0.05 [−1.00]
log(GDP)it 5.12 [0.12] 14.02 [0.29] −5.82 [−0.98] −3.26 [−0.51]
GDP/Capit −3.26 [−2.13] −3.67 [−2.16] −0.40 [−0.93] −0.15 [−0.31]
Taxit −0.14 [−0.56] −0.20 [−0.91] −0.23 [−2.81] −0.25 [−2.98]
CACit −0.59 [−0.20] −2.76 [−0.67] −1.02 [−1.05] −1.85 [−1.41]
Fixed effects
Country Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year No No Yes No No Yes
N 407 407 407 439 439 439
R2 0.07 0.15 0.23 0.08 0.13 0.17
Regressions of FDI into and out of the U.S. on the source-country market-to-book ratio, the host market-to-book ratio, and controls. The FDI data are from the BEA. All variables
are summarized in Table 1. The ﬁrst six columns show regressions explaining FDI ﬂows into the U.S. The second six columns show regressions explaining FDI ﬂows out of the U.S.
Heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics use standard errors that are clustered by year and are shown in brackets.
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cash ﬂow at the country level, so we include ROE. Because ROE also includes
noncash revenues and expenses, it is probably a better proxy than cash ﬂow for
fundamentals and a worse proxy for ﬁnancial slack. We include the log of GDP
and GDP per capita to capture country size and wealth. Desai, Foley, and Hines
(2004) ﬁnd that USmultinationals move capital toward low-tax locations, so we
include corporate tax rates. Many countries impose capital account restrictions,
so we include an index of restrictions. Finally, we use country and sometimes
year effects, because distance- and other country-ﬁxed effects are important
determinants of FDI in models based in trade theory.
The left panel of Table 2 provides preliminary support for the cheap ﬁnancial
capital hypothesis. The effects of the source-country market-to-book on FDI
into the U.S. are reliably positive and signiﬁcant, irrespective of control vari-
ables and ﬁxed effects.16 The coefﬁcients are economically large. The standard
deviation of non-US market-to-book ratios is 0.97, so a one-standard-deviation
increase in source-country market-to-book leads to a six- to ninepercentage-
point increase in FDI into the U.S. This compares to a mean inﬂow of 20.30
percentage points.17
The right panel of Table 2, in contrast, does not provide preliminary sup-
port for the cheap assets view. Country-year-level variation in host-country
conditions does not explain patterns of FDI out of the U.S.: the coefﬁcients
on the host-country market-to-book are weakly positive, not negative.18 The
most robust coefﬁcient is the negative effect of host-country corporate taxes,
consistent with Desai, Foley, and Hines (2004).
These results immediately shed some new light on the prior literature that
includes stock market valuations as potential determinants of FDI patterns,
such as the important contributions of Klein and Rosengren (1994); Dewenter
16 The inclusion of the source-country market-to-book ratio raises the R2 of these speciﬁcations from 0.04 to 0.07
in the ﬁrst pair of columns; from 0.10 to 0.15 in the second; and from 0.20 to 0.23 in the third. These are larger
incremental increases in explanatory power than those of any other single variable we consider.
17 The effects on the control variables are worth noting. First, source-country ROE is negative and signiﬁcant
in explaining FDI ﬂows into the U.S., perhaps surprising given the literature indicating a positive relationship
between internally generated cash and investment. This coefﬁcient is not very robust, however; it is smaller and
statstically weak in Tables 3 and 4. It is also possible that the low accounting returns in the source country indicate
low investment opportunities there. If this were the case, then ﬁrms would be inclined to invest abroad. Second,
prior studies of FDI ﬂows into the U.S., including Froot and Stein (1991) and Blonigen (1997), ﬁnd a negative
coefﬁcient on real exchange rates. We do not ﬁnd a consistent effect. This appears to be due to the sample period.
Froot and Stein’s (1991) sample, for example, runs from 1973 to 1988. We also ﬁnd a negative coefﬁcient over
this period. However, the negative correlation between FDI into the U.S. and the real exchange rate breaks down
in more recent data. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the dollar fell but FDI inﬂows also declined. More recently,
the dollar has strengthened and inﬂows reached record levels. Klein, Peek, and Rosengren (2002) also note this
shift.
18 The effect of US valuations on FDI outﬂows is marginally signiﬁcant in the absence of control variables and
insigniﬁcant when other controls are added. This may partly reﬂect the fact that source-country (US) valuations
vary only by year, not country-year; our procedure for estimating standard errors allows for clustering by country;
and, more fundamentally, the relative capital account openness of the U.S. may reduce the potential for mispricing
(cheap capital) relative to the potential in other countries. The US price-earnings ratio, like the US market to
book, is also not a robust predictor of FDI ﬂows out of the U.S. Finally, another possible explanation for the
weaker US results is agency problems. In other words, managers have a tendency to overinvest, but their ability
to overinvest requires a combination of both high valuations and weak governance. US governance is perhaps
stronger than governance in other parts of the world.
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(1995); and Klein, Peek, and Rosengren (2002). These authors, considering
the “relative wealth” hypothesis of Froot and Stein (1991), include various
proxies for the ratio of stock market valuations in their speciﬁcations. Our
results indicate that the effect of the ratio of stock market capitalizations that
these papers document is actually one sided: high source-country stock market
valuations appear to spur outward FDI, while low host-country valuations seem
to do little to attract inward FDI.
The cheap ﬁnancial capital hypothesis links capital market conditions in
the source country to FDI ﬂows. This is clearly a story about investing new
capital, not just reinvesting retained earnings. So, one would expect source-
country valuations to affect the component of FDI ﬂows associated with capital
raised in the source country in particular. We have run regressions similar
to those presented in the third column of Table 2 using the two components
of FDI—retained earnings and new capital—as separate dependent variables.
When the portion of FDI into the U.S. ﬁnanced by retained earnings is the
dependent variable, the coefﬁcient on the source-country market-to-book ratio
is −0.7, and it has a t-statistic of −1.24. By contrast, when the portion of FDI
into the U.S. ﬁnanced by sources other than retained earnings is used as the
dependent variable, this coefﬁcient is 9.60 with a t-statistic of 6.59. This pattern
is consistent with the cheap capital hypothesis. (We continue to report results
for total FDI as the dependent variable, because it is the concept of most interest
in the prior literature.)
If the results on the effects of the source market-to-book ratio were identi-
ﬁed from only cross-sectional variation, they would raise some concerns. For
example, the measured effects of the source market-to-book ratio might merely
reﬂect the effect of country-level differences in accounting conventions (Joos
and Lang, 1994; and Ball, Kothari, and Robin, 2000). To address such concerns,
in unreported tests we run regressions country-by-country and then average the
coefﬁcients, as in Fama and MacBeth (1973). This isolates a pure time-series
effect. The results are reassuringly similar. The country-ﬁxed effects in Table 2
should also alleviate these concerns. The third column of Table 2 includes year
effects as well as country effects, with not much impact on the source-country
market-to-book coefﬁcient.19
Table 3 uses other FDI data but reaches very similar conclusions. The ﬁrst
two panels consider cross-border M&A transactions that involve a US ﬁrm as
either host or target. In the ﬁrst panel, the effects of source-country market-
to-book are positive and signiﬁcant, indicating that acquisitions of US ﬁrms
19 It is also important to point out that the results in Table 2 do not imply that FDI into the U.S. from country X
increases when valuations in other non-US source countries fall; it is not “relative” valuations across non-US
countries that seem to matter. In another unreported exercise, we include the average annual market-to-book
across source countries as an additional determinant of FDI into the U.S. If it were relative foreign valuations that
determined FDI into the U.S., we would expect this variable to have a coefﬁcient that has an equal magnitude to
and opposite sign of the coefﬁcient on source-country market-to-book. However, like the coefﬁcient on source-
country market-to-book, the coefﬁcient on this variable is actually positive. Hence, FDI from country X into the
U.S. seems to be determined by valuations in country X, not valuations in country X relative to other countries.
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Table 3
FDI and stock market valuations: alternative data sources
Excluding controls Including controls
Coef t-stat Coef t-stat Coef t-stat
Panel A. M&A into the U.S. (M&AiUSt)
M/Bit 1.89 [9.14] 1.63 [8.18] 1.64 [7.83]
M/BUst 0.12 [0.79] −0.18 [−0.76]
Dixed effects
Country Yes Yes Yes
Year No No Yes
N 286 286 286
R2 0.74 0.78 0.82
Panel B. M&A out of the U.S. (M&AUSjt)
M/Bjt 0.59 [0.58] 0.34 [0.30] −0.70 [−0.52]
M/BUst 5.56 [10.95] 5.55 [8.04]
Fixed effects
Country Yes Yes Yes
Year No No Yes
N 286 286 286
R2 0.69 0.73 0.74
Panel C. Bilateral FDI ﬂow (FDIijt)
M/Bit 4.14 [7.50] 6.13 [4.91] 4.79 [3.45]
M/Bjt −0.40 [−0.62] 0.79 [0.78] 0.52 [0.50]
Fixed effects
Country (i and j) Yes Yes Yes
Year No No Yes
N 2,706 2,706 2,706
R2 0.06 0.07 0.09
The ﬁrst two panels show regressions of M&A activity into and out of the U.S. on the source-country market-
to-book ratio, the host-country market-to-book ratio, and controls. The M&A data are from the SDC. Panel A
shows regressions explaining M&A activity into the U.S. Panel B shows regressions explaining M&A activity
out of the U.S. The last panel shows regressions of FDI between 20 developed countries on the source-country
market-to-book ratio, the host-country market-to-book ratio, and controls. The FDI data are from the OECD.
The control variables are return on equity in the source and host country, and the exchange rate, log of GDP,
GDP per capita, tax rates, and the index of capital account closedness from Brune et al. (2001). All variables are
summarized in Table 1. Heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics use standard errors that are clustered by year and
are shown in brackets.
increase when overseas stock markets are highly valued. This is consistent with
the Shleifer and Vishny (2003) theory and the cheap ﬁnancial capital view of
FDI. In the second panel, however, there is again no evidence that cross-border
M&A is driven by low target valuations, inconsistent with the cheap assets
view. In this panel, US ﬁrms’ overseas acquisition activity does appear to be
strongly dependent on US valuations; this is again consistent with the cheap
capital hypothesis, although the effect is estimated from only a fairly short time
series.
The last panel of Table 3 studies a panel of bilateral FDI among 20 de-
veloped countries from the OECD International Direct Investment Statistics.
While these data are less comparable across countries and time, and are of-
ten missing, in principle they allow us to simultaneously consider the cheap
ﬁnancial capital and cheap asset hypotheses in a broad sample. The results
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here are again remarkably similar to those from the US data: source-country
valuations have a strong positive effect on FDI, while host valuations are
unimportant.20
Summing up to this point, we have studied the association between country-
level stock valuations on FDI ﬂows in mostly developed countries. We docu-
ment a strong new fact about FDI ﬂows: there is a very strong positive link
between source-country stock market valuations and FDI. Indeed, the effect
of source-country valuations is stronger, in statistical terms, than any other
determinant of FDI that we study, and to our knowledge may be the strongest
effect on FDI yet documented in the literature. This relationship is consistent
with a cheap ﬁnance story, so in the rest of the paper we probe it further.
The other interesting result is the lack of evidence for a cheap assets view of
FDI in our broad sample. Thus, although Aguiar and Gopinath (2005) ﬁnd
evidence of ﬁre-sale FDI in emerging markets in crisis situations, the majority
of the world’s FDI ﬂows are between developed countries (Feenstra, 1999),
and so the cheap assets channel may not be an important general driver of FDI
patterns.
How might one explain the asymmetry in the support for these two theo-
ries? It is difﬁcult to pin down, but we brieﬂy outlined some possibilities in
the hypotheses development section. An intuitive explanation is that multina-
tionals have better information about their own cost of capital than the cost of
capital or misvaluations in foreign capital markets. Another possibility is that
an asymmetric limit on arbitrage, such as short-sale constraints, increases the
scope for overvaluation relative to undervaluation, thus raising the potential for
cheap capital effects.
3.2 Fundamental and nonfundamental valuations
We now take a closer look at the strong positive effect of source-country
valuations on FDI. While it is consistent with the cheap ﬁnancial capital hy-
pothesis, it is also consistent with many other explanations, because stock
market valuations pick up not only misvaluation but also omitted “funda-
mental” determinants of investment. To explore further, we use future stock
returns as an instrument for the component of market-to-book that reﬂects mis-
pricing, which is the ﬁrst approach to resolving omitted variable bias and is
explained using Equations (4) and (5). For brevity, we focus on the BEA data
on FDI ﬂows into the U.S., which offers the most variation in source-country
valuations.
Once again, the idea behind this approach is that mispricing ex ante can be
detected from the returns that correct themispricing ex post. If future returns are
negatively correlated with ex ante mispricing and otherwise uncorrelated with
measurement error in market-to-book, the ﬁtted values from the ﬁrst stage serve
20 An F-test conﬁrms that the absolute value of the two coefﬁcients is not equal, a ﬁnding inconsistent with the
“relative wealth” hypothesis.
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Table 4
FDI and stock market valuations: fundamental and nonfundamental components
FDI into the U.S. (FDIiUSt)
Coef t-stat Coef t-stat Coef t-stat
Fitted M/Bit 17.58 [2.58] 21.70 [3.94] 22.00 [3.62]
Residual M/Bit 7.61 [4.53] 9.52 [4.26] 8.72 [2.98]
M/BUst −2.07 [−2.82] −2.80 [−1.85]
ROEit −0.54 [−1.50] −0.61 [−1.37]
ROEUst 0.81 [0.97]
Exrateit 0.11 [1.58] −0.01 [−0.14]
Log(GDP)it 0.38 [0.19] −0.26 [−0.13]
GDP/Capit −0.51 [−2.33] −0.48 [−2.09]
Taxit −0.06 [−0.41] −0.06 [−0.40]
CACit 1.56 [0.80] 0.48 [0.20]
Fixed effects
Year No No Yes
N 388 388 388
R2 0.06 0.10 0.17
Regressions of FDI into the U.S. on the source-country market-to-book ratio, the USmarket-to-book
ratio, and controls. The FDI data are from the BEA. All variables are summarized in Table 1. We
decompose the source-countrymarket-to-book ratio into a nonfundamental ormispricing component
(Fitted M/Bit) and a fundamental component (Residual M/Bit). The decomposition is based on a
ﬁrst-stage regression of market-to-book on future returns: Fitted M/Bit = 1.82 − 0.72Rit+1 (N =
426, t-stat = −5.07, R2 = 0.057). Heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics use standard errors that are
clustered by year and are shown in brackets.
as a purer measure of mispricing. The ﬁrst-stage regression of country-level
market-to-book ratios on 1-year-ahead dollar returns yields
ˆM
Bit
= 1.82 − 0.72Rit+1, (12)
with 426 observations, an R2 of 0.057, and a heteroskedasticity robust t-statistic
of 5.07 on the coefﬁcient of −0.72. The residual, and more likely fundamental,
component of the market-to-book ratio is
˜M
Bit
= M
Bit
−
ˆM
Bit
. (13)
Table 4 reports the second-stage results. They suggest that FDI ﬂows are
positively related to both the fundamental and nonfundamental components of
stock market valuations. The nonfundamental coefﬁcient in Table 4 is about
2.5 times as large as the residual M/B coefﬁcient. F-tests indicate that this
difference is signiﬁcant at the 10% level in the last two models. Both effects
remain strong when additional controls are included. However, because the
standard deviation of the nonfundamental component of M/B is only 21% of
that of the residual component, a very rough estimate of overall economic
signiﬁcance would be that, according to this methodology, mispricing is about
half (2.5 times 0.21 equals 0.52) as important as the fundamental component
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of source-country valuations in explaining FDI ﬂows. This strikes us as a
magnitude that is both interesting and plausible.21
As an aside, note that the signiﬁcant coefﬁcient on nonfundamental market-
to-book implies that FDI predicts lower returns in the source stock market.
When one views the results in this way, it is clear that they are not predicted
by typical theories of FDI, rooted in rational expectations and efﬁcient and
integrated world capital markets.22
The approach of Table 4 has some other appealing features. We previously
discussed how the inclusion of country-ﬁxed effects, among other tests, helped
alleviate concerns that the results reﬂected ﬁxed country differences such as,
for example, accounting treatments of book values. Another possibility is that
country accounting systems (or an omitted variable more generally) change
over time in a way that generates measurement error and biases our inferences.
But if this were the case, the approach of using future stock returns as an
instrument for the component of market-to-book that reﬂects mispricing serves
the dual purpose of decomposing the market-to-book effect and alleviating
concerns about measurement error.23
Finally, although our earlier results did not show any support for the cheap
assets hypothesis, we brieﬂy return to it here. In principle, the absence of
a host-country book-to-market effect could mean that low valuations arising
from a high cost of capital attract FDI while low valuations arising from low
growth opportunities repel FDI, and so the two subcomponents are actually
offsetting. Perhaps this accounts for the patterns in Tables 2 and 3. To explore
this, we have conducted an analysis like that in Table 4, using data on FDI
21 In unreported results, we have also decomposed the effects of host- and source-country market-to-book in the
OECD panel. The results are qualitatively similar to those in Table 4, in that the coefﬁcient on the ﬁtted source-
country market-to-book is as large or larger than the coefﬁcient on the residual and the host-country effects
are negligible. The most salient difference from Table 4 is that statistical signiﬁcance is weaker in the case of
the ﬁtted source-country market-to-book, with t-statistics of less than two. In speciﬁcations that include the full
set of controls, as well as host- and source-country ﬁxed effects, the coefﬁcient on the ﬁtted source-country
market-to-book is 8.79 with a t-statistic of 1.84. In speciﬁcations that exclude the controls or include year-ﬁxed
effects, the coefﬁcient and its t-statistic are slightly lower. The lack of signiﬁcance may reﬂect the shorter time
series of data in the OECD panel or the greater measurement error related to shortcomings in how data for
non-US countries are collected.
22 We have explicitly conﬁrmed that FDI ﬂows into the U.S. could be used to predict source-country returns (with a
negative sign). A table is available on request. We have also veriﬁed that these results are not driven by the small-
sample bias in return prediction regressions discussed in Nelson and Kim (1993); Kothari and Shanken (1997);
and Stambaugh (1999). Finally, in decomposing valuations into fundamental and nonfundamental components
as in Equations (12) and (13), we are assuming that mispricing is completely corrected in the next year. In
unreported results, we have added the second- and third-year-ahead returns as determinants of the ﬁtted value
in Equation (12), i.e., allowing mispricing a longer interval to correct. There is no change in the point estimates
versus those in Table 4. We prefer to report the results using only 1-year-ahead returns in order to avoid the
complexities of statistical inference with overlapping returns data.
23 That is, consider the approach to measurement error described by Greene (2000) on pp. 378–80. We would like
to observe the component of market-to-book that reﬂects mispricing without measurement issues, M, but instead
we only observe it with measurement issues, M∗ with M∗ = M + u. If future returns are correlated with the
component of market-to-book that we want to capture and uncorrelated with u, then instrumenting for M∗ with
future returns yields consistent estimates of the effects of source-country mispricings on FDI. The identifying
assumption here is that changes in country accounting systems over time are largely uncorrelated with future
returns.
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out of the U.S. instead of FDI into the U.S. and decompositions of the host
market-to-book instead of the source market-to-book. In unreported results,
the impacts of both components of host market-to-book are only one-third
to one-fourth as large as those of the components of source market-to-book.
Moreover, the predicted impact of the ﬁtted host market-to-book, which has
the larger point estimate than the residual market-to-book, is of the wrong sign
for the cheap asset hypothesis: a high future host return (and hence low-ﬁtted
value) is actually associated with lower FDI. These inconsistent signs and
the generally much weaker results lend further support to the conclusion that
host-country valuations do not have much effect on FDI in our broad sample.
3.3 Limits to cross-market arbitrage
While the results in Table 4 provide further evidence consistent with FDI re-
sponding to cheap ﬁnancial capital, they cannot completely rule out a spurious
correlation. The identifying assumption in Table 4 is that future returns are
uncorrelated with omitted country characteristics that inﬂuence FDI. However,
this would not be the case if, for example, investors are routinely too optimistic
when underlying investment opportunities are also fundamentally good. We
can address this possibility using our second method for addressing omitted
variable bias, which examines whether the effect of source-country valuations
is relatively more pronounced where capital account restrictions are relatively
more severe. The idea is that such restrictions limit cross-market arbitrage,mak-
ing extreme values of market-to-book in the presence of such restrictions more
likely to reﬂect mispricing. Put differently, we use capital account closedness
as an instrument for the existence of mispricing, not the direction.
Table 5 runs regressions that interact valuation ratios with an index of capital
account closedness. We standardize this variable to have zero mean and unit
variance. The left columns show that capital account restrictions tend to increase
the effect of source-country market-to-book, with a signiﬁcant effect in the ﬁrst
speciﬁcation and a marginally signiﬁcant effect in the second. The interaction
is not signiﬁcant in the third speciﬁcation. (Remember that, as detailed in the
methodology section, this test can only detect an effect if the coefﬁcient on
the mispricing piece of M/B is actually larger than the fundamental piece.
Hence, an insigniﬁcant result is not a rejection of the premise.) An F-test based
on this speciﬁcation implies that at the lowest level of the capital account
restrictions index, which characterizes about 10% of the sample, the source-
country aggregate market-to-book is no longer a signiﬁcant determinant of
FDI.
The effect of capital account restrictions comes through more sharply in a
third approach to omitted variables bias, where we combine the ﬁrst two ap-
proaches. We use future returns to home in on the mispricing component of
market-to-book and then look at the effect of that component in the presence of
capital account restrictions. The results are in the right columns of Table 5. In
each speciﬁcation, the coefﬁcients on the ﬁtted component of source-country
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Table 5
FDI and stock market valuations: closed capital accounts
FDI into the U.S. (FDIiUSt)
M/B M/B decomposition
Coef t-stat Coef t-stat Coef t-stat Coef t-stat Coef t-stat Coef t-stat
M/Bit 7.95 [2.78] 10.93 [4.55] 8.71 [2.97]
M/Bit · CACit 4.89 [2.59] 4.43 [2.67] 2.30 [1.02]
Fitted M/Bit 13.40 [1.80] 18.87 [3.73] 17.07 [2.42]
Fitted M/Bit · CACit 19.37 [3.03] 22.49 [3.62] 21.51 [3.06]
Residual M/Bit 8.74 [5.55] 10.77 [5.45] 9.35 [3.30]
Residual M/Bit · CACit 1.01 [0.53] 3.00 [1.60] 1.83 [0.97]
CACit 1.29 [0.44] −2.20 [−0.64] −5.83 [−1.06] −27.33 [−2.92] −30.89 [−3.24] −35.41 [−3.09]
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Fixed effects
Country Yes Yes Yes No No No
Year No No Yes No No Yes
N 407 407 407 388 388 388
R2 0.08 0.16 0.23 0.09 0.13 0.20
Regressions of FDI into the U.S. on the source-country market-to-book ratio, the US market-to-book ratio, the interaction of source-country
market-to-book with a capital account openness index, and controls. The FDI data are from the BEA. All variables are summarized in Table
1. We decompose the source-country market-to-book ratio into a nonfundamental or mispricing component (Fitted M/Bit) and a fundamental
component (Residual M/Bit). The decomposition is based on a ﬁrst-stage regression of market-to-book on future returns: Fitted M/Bit = 1.82
− 0.72Rit+1 (N = 426, t-stat = −5.07, R2 = 0.057). Source market-to-book or its components are then interacted with an index of capital
account closedness from Brune et al. (2001) for the second-stage regression. CAC is standardized to have zero mean and unit variance. The
control variables are return on equity in the source and host country, and the exchange rate, log of GDP, GDP per capita, and tax rates.
Heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics use standard errors that are clustered by year and are shown in brackets.
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Table 6
FDI and stock market valuations: alternative deﬁnitions of capital account closedness
FDI into the U.S. (FDIiUSt)
M/B M/B decomposition
Excluding FDI Outgoing FDI
closedness
Capital market
closedness
Excluding FDI Outgoing FDI
closedness
Capital market
closedness
Coef t-stat Coef t-stat Coef t-stat Coef t-stat Coef t-stat Coef t-stat
M/Bit 9.41 [2.82] 7.68 [3.46] 7.77 [3.56]
M/Bit · CACit 3.57 [1.43] 0.75 [0.74] 3.53 [1.41]
Fitted M/Bit 16.03 [2.13] 22.20 [3.62] 16.61 [2.72]
Fitted M/Bit · CACit 22.89 [3.05] 1.13 [0.21] 25.92 [2.92]
Residual M/Bit 9.60 [3.20] 8.08 [2.55] 8.38 [3.12]
Residual M/Bit · CACit 1.97 [1.04] 1.19 [0.90] 2.15 [1.09]
CACit −6.61 [−1.20] −4.22 [−0.95] −7.48 [−1.41] −37.65 [−3.16] −1.21 [−0.12] −43.17 [−2.95]
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects
Country Yes Yes Yes No No No
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 407 407 407 388 388 388
R2 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.21 0.18 0.21
Regressions of FDI into the U.S. on source-country market-to-book ratio, the US market-to-book, the interaction of source-country market-to-
book with a capital account openness index, and controls. FDI data are from the BEA. All variables are summarized in Table 1. We decompose
the source-country market-to-book into a nonfundamental or mispricing component (Fitted M/Bit) and a fundamental component (Residual
M/Bit). The decomposition is based on a ﬁrst-stage regression of market-to-book on future returns: Fitted M/Bit = 1.82 – 0.72Rit+1 (N = 426,
t-stat = −5.07, R2 = 0.057). Source market-to-book or its components are then interacted with versions of the Brune et al. (2001) measure of
capital account closedness for the second stage. The Brune et al. measure includes restrictions on ﬁve types of transactions: invisible, capital
and money market, credit market, FDI, and commercial banking. The ﬁrst four are divided into ingoing and outgoing restrictions. We consider
measures that exclude the FDI components of the index; that are based only on capital and money market transactions; and that are based only
on outgoing FDI restrictions. Each measure is standardized to have zero mean and unit variance. The control variables are return on equity in
the source and host, the exchange rate, log GDP, GDP per capita, and tax rates. Heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics use standard errors that
are clustered by year and are shown in brackets.363
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market-to-book, and on its interactions with capital account restrictions, are
positive and signiﬁcant. Meanwhile, the coefﬁcients on the fundamental com-
ponent of valuations are positive and signiﬁcant, but the coefﬁcients on its
interaction terms are not. This pattern of results accords closely with predic-
tions. It suggests that the strategy of using capital account restrictions and
future returns to identify mispricing is successful, and provides fairly rigorous
evidence that FDI is increased by the presence of cheap ﬁnance.24
Finally, we consider a set of robustness checks involving capital account
closedness, our instrument for the existence of mispricing. Capital account
restrictions take several forms. In addition to restrictions that limit the ﬂow of
portfolio investor capital, the index includes restrictions on FDI itself. While
we already control for the direct effect of the restrictions in our regressions,
it is useful to verify that the interaction results in Table 5 come about through
the ability of CAC to identify the limits to portfolio investor arbitrage and the
extent of mispricing and not through some mechanical interactive effect on
FDI.
Table 6 addresses this concern using alternative deﬁnitions of CAC. We
consider three alternative indices. One excludes all FDI restrictions (inward
and outward); one includes only outward FDI restrictions; and one includes
only restrictions on capital and money market securities. The results show that
excluding FDI restrictions makes little difference to the interaction coefﬁcients,
versus those in Table 5. The index based solely on restrictions on FDI outﬂows
has no interesting interactions. These results conﬁrm that restrictions on FDI
outﬂows do not drive the effects documented earlier through a mechanical
effect. Rather, much of the effect of the overall index appears to be coming
through capital and money market transaction restrictions, as suggested in the
last columns of Table 6. These results provide further support for the validity
of our identiﬁcation strategies and closely match the predictions of the cheap
ﬁnance hypothesis.
4. Conclusion
Traditional theories of FDI assume that world capital markets are informa-
tionally efﬁcient and integrated. However, various lines of empirical evidence
suggests that country-level shocks to investor optimism or risk aversion, com-
bined with limits to arbitrage by portfolio investors, sometimes cause the same
capital asset to sell for different prices in different locations. Equivalently,
the risk-adjusted costs of capital sometimes differ around the world. These
24 We list further robustness exercises here. First, we ﬁnd similar results if the capital control indicator from the
IMF is used in place of the Brune et al. (2001) measure. Second, Japan’s FDI to the U.S. reached very high levels
prior to the decline of the Japanese stock market and the relaxation of some Japanese capital controls. While this
pattern is highly consistent with a cheap ﬁnancial capital channel, the results are qualitatively similar if Japan
is dropped. Third, for theoretical reasons explained in an earlier footnote, we prefer to omit country effects in
Tables 4 and 5. Their inclusion, however, leads to very similar and often statistically stronger results.
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observations suggest that there may be a role for arbitrage by multinationals in
the form of FDI.
In this paper, we discuss and empirically evaluate two basic views of
mispricing-driven FDI. The cheap assets view sees FDI as the purchase of
undervalued host-country assets, while the cheap ﬁnance view sees FDI as
an opportunistic use of the low-cost ﬁnancial capital available to overvalued
source-country ﬁrms. To provide a large-sample test, we exploit country-year
variation in stock market valuations, realized returns (which contain ex post
information about ex ante mispricing), and limits to cross-market arbitrage.
The results are consistent with a pervasive cheap ﬁnancial capital effect on
FDI but do not support the existence of a cheap assets effect. In preliminary
regression tests, FDI ﬂows are very strongly positively related to source-country
stock market valuations but not strongly negatively related to host-country
valuations. This asymmetry has at least two natural explanations. One is that
multinationals may have better information about their own cost of capital
than about the cost of capital or misvaluations in foreign capital markets. The
other is that an asymmetric limit on arbitrage, such as a short-sale constraint,
may increase the scope for FDI as a means to exploit overvaluation relative to
undervaluation.
A series of further tests, guided by a fairly general econometric method-
ology, indicates that an important component of the source-country valuation
effect likely reﬂects mispricing and not omitted variables bias. FDI ﬂows are
particularly affected by the component of valuations that is likely to reﬂect
mispricing, and especially in the presence of capital account restrictions that
limit arbitrage by portfolio investors. In summary, while our tests certainly
do not rule out alternative explanations for FDI, they appear to rule in the
source-country cost-of-capital as a new determinant of FDI.
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